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Congress 
Abstract 
[Excerpt] The Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC) is a federal corporation established under 
Title IV of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA, P.L. 93-406). The PBGC insures 
private pension beneficiaries against the complete loss of accrued benefits if their defined benefit 
pension plan is terminated without adequate funding. The PBGC receives no appropriations from general 
revenue. Its operations are financed by insurance premiums set by Congress and paid by sponsors of 
defined benefit plans, investment income from the assets in its trust fund, and recoveries from the 
companies formerly responsible for the trusteed plans. 
The PBGC insures the pension benefits of 44 million workers and retirees. In fiscal year 2007, the PBGC 
paid about $4.3 billion in benefits to almost 1.3 million workers whose pension plans had failed. The 
PBGC currently has a $14.1 billion deficit in assets necessary to satisfy all claims made through FY2007. 
Although, the PBGC’s liabilities are not explicitly backed by the full faith and credit of the federal 
government, should the agency become financially insolvent, the Congress could face political pressure 
to bail out the PBGC at taxpayer expense. 
As of September 30, 2007, the value of the PBGC’s total investments, including cash and investment 
income, was approximately $62.6 billion. Premium income is required by law to be invested in debt 
obligations guaranteed by the U.S. government. The assets from terminated plans and their sponsors are 
accounted for in a trust fund that was most recently valued at $48.1 billion. There are no statutory 
limitations on how PBGC can invest the assets in its trust fund. 
In February 2008, the PBGC announced that it had adopted a new investment policy aimed at generating 
higher investment returns. The new policy allocates 45% of the assets to fixed-income investments, 45% 
to equity investments and 10% to alternative investment classes, including real estate and private equity. 
The PBGC’s previous investment policy, adopted in 2004, set an equity investment target of 15% to 25%, 
with the remaining assets allocated primarily to fixed income investments. 
If the PBGC’s higher expected investment returns are accompanied by reduced risk – as the PBGC has 
asserted – then U.S. taxpayers, as the ultimate guarantors of PBGC insurance, will be better off. However, 
if the higher returns are accompanied by commensurately higher risk, then taxpayers are neither better 
nor worse off, because the PBGC’s true financial condition will not have changed. Taxpayers would be 
worse off under the new policy if higher investment returns forestall fundamental reforms in the pension 
insurance system – such as adopting risk-based premiums – that could result in improving the long-term 
financial condition of the agency. Taxpayers, who would benefit from reduced exposure to the risk of 
having to bail out the PBGC if fundamental reforms in PBGC financing and governance were enacted, will 
be worse off if the agency does not achieve the reduction in its deficit that it has predicted the new 
investment policy will attain. 
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Summary 
The Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC) is a federal corporation 
established under Title IV of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 
(ERISA, P.L. 93-406). The PBGC insures private pension beneficiaries against the 
complete loss of accrued benefits if their defined benefit pension plan is terminated 
without adequate funding. The PBGC receives no appropriations from general 
revenue. Its operations are financed by insurance premiums set by Congress and paid 
by sponsors of defined benefit plans, investment income from the assets in its trust 
fund, and recoveries from the companies formerly responsible for the trusteed plans. 
The PBGC insures the pension benefits of 44 million workers and retirees. In 
fiscal year 2007, the PBGC paid about $4.3 billion in benefits to almost 1.3 million 
workers whose pension plans had failed. The PBGC currently has a $14.1 billion 
deficit in assets necessary to satisfy all claims made through FY2007. Although, the 
PBGC’s liabilities are not explicitly backed by the full faith and credit of the federal 
government, should the agency become financially insolvent, the Congress could face 
political pressure to bail out the PBGC at taxpayer expense. 
As of September 30, 2007, the value of the PBGC’s total investments, including 
cash and investment income, was approximately $62.6 billion. Premium income is 
required by law to be invested in debt obligations guaranteed by the U.S. 
government. The assets from terminated plans and their sponsors are accounted for 
in a trust fund that was most recently valued at $48.1 billion. There are no statutory 
limitations on how PBGC can invest the assets in its trust fund. 
In February 2008, the PBGC announced that it had adopted a new investment 
policy aimed at generating higher investment returns. The new policy allocates 45% 
of the assets to fixed-income investments, 45% to equity investments and 10% to 
alternative investment classes, including real estate and private equity. The PBGC’s 
previous investment policy, adopted in 2004, set an equity investment target of 15% 
to 25%, with the remaining assets allocated primarily to fixed income investments. 
If the PBGC’s higher expected investment returns are accompanied by reduced 
risk – as the PBGC has asserted – then U.S. taxpayers, as the ultimate guarantors of 
PBGC insurance, will be better off. However, if the higher returns are accompanied 
by commensurately higher risk, then taxpayers are neither better nor worse off, 
because the PBGC’s true financial condition will not have changed. Taxpayers 
would be worse off under the new policy if higher investment returns forestall 
fundamental reforms in the pension insurance system – such as adopting risk-based 
premiums – that could result in improving the long-term financial condition of the 
agency. Taxpayers, who would benefit from reduced exposure to the risk of having 
to bail out the PBGC if fundamental reforms in PBGC financing and governance 
were enacted, will be worse off if the agency does not achieve the reduction in its 
deficit that it has predicted the new investment policy will attain. 
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(PBGC) Investment Policy: Issues for 
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Background on the PBGC 
The Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC) is a federal corporation 
established under Title IV of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 
(ERISA, P.L. 93-406). The PBGC insures private pension beneficiaries against the 
complete loss of accrued benefits if their defined benefit pension plan is terminated 
without adequate funding. The PBGC receives no appropriations from general 
revenue. Its operations are financed by insurance premiums set by Congress and paid 
by sponsors of defined benefit plans, investment income from the assets in its trust 
fund, and recoveries from the companies formerly responsible for the trusteed plans. 
The Two Kinds of Pension Plans 
There are two kinds of pension plans: “defined benefit” plans and “defined 
contribution” plans. A participant in a defined benefit plan receives a fixed benefit 
at retirement prescribed by a formula set forth in the plan, usually based on pay, years 
of service, or both. The employer makes contributions to the plan based on actuarial 
calculations designed to ensure that the plan has sufficient funds to pay the future 
benefit prescribed by the formula. Under a defined contribution plan, no particular 
benefit is promised. Instead, benefits are based on the balance of an individual 
account maintained for the benefit of the employee. The benefit received by a 
participant at retirement is generally dependent on two factors: total contributions 
made to the plan during the worker’s participation in the plan, and the investment 
experience of the amounts contributed on the employee’s behalf. Under either type 
of pension plan, employees may be permitted to make contributions. The PBGC 
insures qualified defined benefit pensions provided by employers in the private 
sector. A plan is qualified if it meets the requirements of the Internal Revenue Code 
and ERISA, and is thus eligible for favorable tax treatment. Defined contribution 
plans and non-qualified defined benefit plans are not insured by the PBGC. 
In a defined benefit plan, the employer bears the risk of investment losses. The 
Internal Revenue Code and ERISA contain minimum funding standards that require 
the employer to make contributions to a defined benefit plan to fund promised 
benefits. If, for example, the plan experiences poor investment performance or 
actuarial miscalculations, the employer will be required to make additional 
contributions to the plan. The minimum funding rules provide for funding over a 
period of time, and do not require the plan to have sufficient assets to pay all the 
benefits earned under the plan at any particular time. It is possible for a defined 
benefit plan to terminate without having sufficient assets to pay promised benefits. 
The PBGC insures defined benefit plan benefits up to certain limits to protect plan 
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participants in the event of such a termination. However, the PBGC may not protect 
all benefits promised under a plan. Consequently, if a defined benefit plan is 
terminated while it is not fully funded, the participants might receive less from the 
PBGC than they were promised under the plan. 
The PBGC’s Benefit Guarantee 
The PBGC currently insures the pension benefits of 44 million workers and 
retirees participating in more than 30,000 private-sector defined benefit pension 
plans. In FY2007, the PBGC paid about $4.3 billion in benefits to almost 1.3 million 
individuals whose pension plans had failed.1 
The PBGC insures both single-employer and multiemployer pension plans. The 
PBGC’s single-employer program guarantees payment of basic pension benefits 
when an underfunded plan terminates. When an underfunded pension plan sponsored 
by a financially distressed company is terminated, the PBGC takes over the plan 
assets and assumes responsibility for paying retirement benefits to the plan’s 
participants, subject to the statutory benefit limits. 
The single-employer insurance program. In 2007, the PBGC’s 
single-employer program insured the pensions of 33.8 million workers and retirees 
in about 28,900 plans. The program is directly responsible for the benefits of about 
1.2 million workers and retirees in almost 3,800 trusteed pension plans. The PBGC 
insurance program for single-employer plans reported a deficit of $13.11 billion in 
FY2007, based on assets of $67.24 billion and liabilities of $80.35 billion.2 The 
deficit for 2007 was $5 billion less than the $18.1 billion deficit reported one year 
earlier. The PBGC reported that the decline in the deficit was due primarily to 
investment income of $4.7 billion and a $2.8 billion actuarial credit as a result of 
higher valuation interest factors.3 
Through the end of FY2006, the PBGC’s single-employer program had incurred 
net claims of $29.0 billion (see Table 1.) Of this amount, nine of the ten largest 
claims against the PBGC, totaling $19.8 billion, occurred between 2001 and 2005. 
The PBGC’s net claims equal the portion of guaranteed benefit liabilities not covered 
by plan assets or recovered from the general assets of the employer. These claims will 
eventually have to be covered through premiums, earnings on PBGC assets, or other 
sources of revenue. 
The multiemployer insurance program. Multiemployer plans are 
collectively bargained plans to which more than one company makes contributions. 
The PBGC’s multiemployer program provides financial assistance through loans to 
insolvent plans to enable them to pay benefits. The PBGC does not become the 
trustee of insolvent multiemployer plans. These loans (which are typically not repaid) 
PBGC, Annual Management Report, 2007. [http://www.pbgc.gov/docs/2007AMR.pdf] 
PBGC, Annual Management Report, 2007. 
In general, changes in pension liabilities are inversely related to changes in interest rates. 
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generally continue year after year until the plan no longer needs assistance or has paid 
all promised benefits at the guaranteed level. 
In 2007, the PBGC’s multiemployer program insured the pensions of 9.9 million 
workers and retirees in about 1,530 plans. The multiemployer program reported a net 
deficit of $955 million, a $216 million net deterioration from the end of the previous 
year.4 The loss for the year was due largely to PBGC’s booking of additional 
probable losses from expected future financial assistance to troubled plans. The 
program had assets of $1.2 billion and liabilities totaling about $2.2 billion. 
Table 1 . Claims Experience of PBGC Single-Employer 
Insurance Program and Probable Future Terminations 
(Dollar amounts in millions) 
Year of 
Termination 
1975-1979 
1980-1984 
1985-1989 
1990-1994 
1995-1999 
2000 
2001 
2002 
2003 
2004 
2005 
2006 
Subtotal 
Probable 
Future 
Terminations 
Total 
Number 
of Plans 
586 
621 
537 
693 
440 
72 
117 
178 
156 
145 
97 
31 
3,673 
27 
3,700 
Benefit 
Liability 
$397 
$1,257 
$2,351 
$5,116 
$2,196 
$367 
$3,687 
$8,243 
$13,307 
$5,967 
$21,592 
$678 
$65,159 
$17,430 
$82,589 
Trust Plan 
Assets 
$145 
$514 
$651 
$2,275 
$1,413 
$266 
$2,536 
$4,505 
$6,922 
$2,802 
$10,137 
$366 
$32,532 
$12,568 
$45,100 
Recoveries 
from 
Employers 
$56 
$158 
$159 
$446 
$73 
$15 
$185 
$278 
$150 
$481 
$1,579 
$13 
$3,593 
$0 
$3,593 
Net Claims 
$196 
$586 
$1,541 
$2,396 
$710 
$85 
$966 
$3,460 
$6,235 
$2,684 
$9,876 
$299 
$29,033 
$4,862 
$33,895 
Average Net 
Claim Per 
Terminated Plan 
$0.33 
$0.94 
$2.87 
$3.46 
$1.61 
$1.19 
$8.26 
$19.44 
$39.97 
$18.51 
$101.81 
$9.66 
$7.91 
----
Notes: Stated amounts are subject to change until PBGC finalizes values for liabilities, assets, 
and recoveries of terminated plans. Amounts in this table are valued as of the date of each 
plan's termination and differ from amounts reported in PBGC's Financial Statements which are 
valued as of the end of the fiscal year. Numbers may not add up to totals due to rounding. 
Source: Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation. 
PBGC benefit limits. There is a statutory ceiling on the benefits that are 
insured by the PBGC. A different benefit limit applies to each program. For plans 
that terminate in 2008, the annual limit for the single-employer program is 
$51,750 for a single life annuity payable at age 65. The guarantee for the 
PBGC, Annual Management Report, 2007. 
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multiemployer program is much lower. In 2008, for an individual with 30 years 
of service, the annual guaranteed limit is $12,870. The annual benefit limits are 
indexed each year to the average annual increase in wages in jobs covered by 
Social Security. Because the benefit limit is higher than the pensions earned by 
most participants in insured plans, most workers in single-employer plans taken 
over by PBGC receive the full benefit earned at the time of termination. However, 
the lower guarantee limit for the multiemployer program has left most of the 
retirees in insolvent plans without their full benefits.5 
The PBGC currently has a $14.1 billion deficit in assets necessary to 
satisfy all claims made through 2007. The Government Accountability Office 
(GAO) has identified PBGC’s single-employer program as “high-risk,” stating that 
“the program remains exposed to the threat of terminations of large underfunded 
plans in weak industries and of sponsors voluntarily terminating or freezing their 
[defined benefit] plans.”6 In 2007, the PBGC’s estimated potential exposure to 
future claims was approximately $66 billion, down from $73 billion in 2006.7 Not 
all underfunded pension plans are likely to present claims to the PBGC. The 
estimate of $66 billion represents underfunding of plan sponsors whose credit 
ratings are below investment grade or meet one or more financial distress criteria. 
It is not an estimate of likely claims against the PBGC. 
The PBGC’s liabilities are not explicitly backed by the full faith and credit 
of the federal government.8 However, should the agency become financially 
insolvent, the GAO has noted that “the Congress could face enormous pressure to 
bail out the PBGC at taxpayer expense.”9 
Sources of Funding 
The PBGC receives no appropriations from general revenues. Instead, by 
law the agency’s operations are financed from four sources: 
! insurance premiums paid by the sponsors of covered private 
defined benefit pension plans; 
! assets from terminated plans taken over by the PBGC; 
! investment income; and, 
! recoveries from sponsors of terminated pension plans in 
bankruptcy proceedings. 
In addition, the PBGC has the authority to borrow up to $100 million from the 
U.S. Treasury. 
5
 PBGC, Annual Management Report, 2007. 
6
 United States Government Accountability Office, High-Risk Series: An Update, January 
2007, at [http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d07310.pdf]. 
7
 PBGC, Annual Management Report, 2007. 
8
 29 U.S.C. § 1302(g)(2) 
9
 David Walker, Testimony of the Comptroller General, Hearing of the Senate Commerce, 
Science, and Transportation Committee, “The Impact of Federal Pensions and Bankruptcy 
Policy on the Financial Health of the Airline Industry,” October 7, 2004. 
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PBGC premiums. Unlike insurers in the private sector, the PBGC cannot 
set the premiums for the insurance it provides. Plan sponsors are required by law to 
purchase insurance from the PBGC, and the insurance premiums are set by Congress. 
Historically, premiums have been the most reliable source of PBGC revenue. The 
agency received $1.557 billion in premium revenue in 2007.10 
An employer that maintains a single-employer defined benefit pension plan 
must pay an annual premium for each participant in the plan. The PBGC’s 
single-employer premium income was $1.48 billion in FY2007. Initially set at $1 per 
participant by ERISA in 1974, Congress has raised the premium periodically since 
then. The Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1987 (P.L. 100-203) imposed an 
additional variable rate premium on underfunded plans. The variable rate premium 
was initially set at $6 for each $1,000 of the plan’s unfunded vested benefits, up to 
a maximum of $34 per participant. 
The Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990 (P.L. 101-508) increased 
the basic per capita premium to $19, and the variable rate premium to $9 for each 
$1,000 of the plan’s unfunded vested benefits, up to a maximum of $53 per 
participant. Beginning in 1991, the maximum variable rate premium was $72 per 
participant. The Retirement Protection Act of 1994 (P.L. 103-465) left the per capita 
premium at $19 per participant. However, the cap on the variable rate premium was 
phased out over a 3-year period beginning in 1994. 
The Deficit Reduction Act of 2005 (DRA, P.L. 109-171) increased the per 
capita premium from $19 to $30 for 2006 and indexed the premium to the annual rate 
of growth in the national average wage beginning in 2007. The 2008 premium rate 
for single-employer plans is $33 per participant. The DRA also created a new 
premium of $1,250 per participant to be assessed on any underfunded 
single-employer plan that undergoes a distress termination or is involuntarily 
terminated by the PBGC, to be paid annually for each of the three years following the 
date of termination, or if later, the employer’s exit from bankruptcy. This premium 
is in addition to any other PBGC premiums that are due for the plan year. As enacted 
by the DRA, the special premium would not have applied to plans terminated after 
December 31, 2010. 
The Pension Protection Act of 2006 (PPA, P.L. 109-280) made the special 
termination premium permanent for plans that undergo a distress termination or are 
involuntarily terminated by the PBGC. The PPA also made the variable rate premium 
of $9 per $1,000 of underfunding more widely applicable. Prior to enactment of the 
PPA, the variable rate premium was waived for an underfunded plan if it was not 
underfunded in any two consecutive years out of the previous three years. Under the 
PPA, the variable premium is assessed on all underfunded plans, regardless of the 
plan’s funding status in earlier years. 
The premium for multiemployer plans was initially $0.50 per participant. The 
Multiemployer Pension Plan Amendments Act of 1980 (P.L. 96-364) raised the 
premium to $1.40 for years after 1980. This premium was set to increase gradually 
PBGC, Annual Management Report, 2007. 
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to $2.60. The DRA of 2005 increased the flat-rate per-participant premium for 
multiemployer defined benefit plans from $2.60 to $8.00. For the 2007 plan year and 
later plan years, the premium will be adjusted annually by the rate of growth in the 
national average wage. The PBGC’s multiemployer premium income equaled $81 
million in FY2007. 
As shown in Table 2, since 1998, growth in the PBGC’s premium revenue 
has been outpaced by increases in benefit payments to plan beneficiaries and 
administrative and investment expenses. 
Table 2. PBGC Premium Revenue and Benefit Payments, 
1997-2007 
Amounts in millions 
Fiscal 
Year 
1997 
1998 
1999 
2000 
2001 
2002 
2003 
2004 
2005 
2006 
2007 
Total 
Premium 
Revenue 
$1,090 
989 
925 
831 
845 
812 
973 
1,485 
1,477 
1,500 
1,557 
Benefit 
Payments 
$824 
848 
902 
903 
1,043 
1,538 
2,489 
3,007 
3,686 
4,082 
4,266 
Administrative and 
Investment Expenses 
$155 
158 
161 
167 
184 
225 
290 
288 
342 
405 
378 
Premiums Minus Benefit 
Payments and Expenses 
$111 
-17 
-138 
-239 
-382 
-951 
-1,806 
-1,810 
-2,551 
-2,987 
-3,087 
Source: Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation. 
Recent Reforms. Although the PBGC’s net position has improved $9.2 
billion since 2004, it fell $31.0 billion from 2001 to 2004. Many factors contributed 
to the large swing in PBGC’s funded position, chief among them the terminations in 
2002 and 2005 of several large pension plans in the steel and airline industries with 
high levels of underfunding. Falling interest rates (used to discount future benefit 
payments) significantly increased the value of PBGC’s liabilities, and poor stock 
market returns in 2001 and 2002 resulted in negative investment income. 
In part to address the PBGC’s deteriorating funded status, Congress passed 
the Pension Protection Act of 2006, the most comprehensive reform of the nation’s 
pension laws since the enactment of ERISA in 1974. The PPA established new 
funding rules for defined benefit plans, increased the flat-rate premium paid by 
pension plan sponsors, and required the variable premium to be assessed on all 
underfunded plans. The PPA provided for exceptions to some of the new funding 
rules for plans sponsored by commercial airlines. 
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While the impact of these reforms is still unclear, the Congressional Budget 
Office (CBO) has stated that the PPA failed to address the underlying structural 
problems facing the PBGC, because the increased premiums are not commensurate 
with the amount of unfunded pension claims from terminated plans that the PBGC 
is likely to assume in the future.11 
The future financial condition of the PBGC is highly uncertain because it 
depends greatly on how many private pension plans terminate and on the amount of 
underfunding in those plans. Both factors are difficult to forecast. Over its history, 
a relatively few pension plans with very large unfunded liabilities have dominated the 
PBGC’s claims, and its future may likewise depend significantly on the fate of a few 
large plans. Future terminations will be influenced by overall economic conditions, 
the prosperity of particular industries, competition from abroad, and a variety of 
factors that are specific to particular firms — such as their competitiveness in their 
industries, their agreements with labor groups, and the credit ratings. In addition, the 
PBGC’s losses with respect to future terminations will depend on how well 
companies fund their plans. 
The PBGC’s exposure to pension plan underfunding can shift dramatically 
from year to year in response to conditions in the stock market and changes in 
interest rates. A recent report by Credit Suisse Equity Research estimated that the 
funded status of defined benefit pension plans operated by companies in the Standard 
& Poor’s 500 had declined by about $170 billion from the end of 2007 to the middle 
of 2008, due primarily to poor investment returns. In the aggregate, pension plans 
were overfunded by $60 billion at the end of 2007 and were underfunded by $110 
billion by the middle of 2008.12 Pension plan funding levels had seen steady 
improvement since 2002, when pension plans had more than $200 billion in 
underfunding. 
Background on PBGC Investment Policy 
PBGC’s Investment Income 
In recent years, investment income from the PBGC’s assets has outpaced 
premium income as a source of revenue, as shown in Figure 1. The sources of the 
assets invested by the PBGC are premium revenues, assets of terminated plans, and 
recoveries from the general assets of plan sponsors. The termination of several large 
pension plans in 2002 and 2005 contributed to a large increase in the assets in 
PBGC’s investment portfolio. As of September 30, 2007, the value of the PBGC’s 
total investments, including cash and investment income, was approximately $62.6 
billion. The PBGC’s investment income in FY2007 was $4.76 billion. The rate of 
return on investment was approximately 7.6%. 
11
 CBO, Letter to Honorable George Miller, Chairman, House Committee on Education and 
Labor, April 24, 2008, at [http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/91xx/doc9156/04-24-Miller-
PBGC_Letter.pdf]. 
12
 Credit Suisse, Pension Plans Losing Ground, July 18, 2008. 
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Figure 1. PBGC Income from Premiums and Investment 
Earnings, 1997-2007 
Source: PBGC annual reports, 1997-2007. 
The PBGC maintains two separate financial programs, each consisting of a 
revolving fund and a trust fund, to sustain its single-employer and multiemployer plan 
insurance programs. Premium revenues are accounted for in revolving funds that are 
included in the federal budget. By law, the PBGC is required to invest certain 
revolving fund assets in debt obligations issued or guaranteed by the United States, 
while other assets can be invested in other debt obligations.13 Current policy is to 
invest these revolving funds only in Treasury securities. At the end of FY2007, the 
revolving funds’ value was $14.5 billion. 
13
 PBGC has seven revolving funds, referred to collectively as “the revolving fund.” Total 
revolving fund income, including cash and investment income, as of September 30, 2007, 
was approximately $1.0 billion for Fund 1, $1.2 billion for Fund 2, and $12.3 billion for 
Fund 7. ERISA authorized the establishment of Funds 3, 4, 5 and 6 for special purposes that 
have never been utilized by the PBGC. Excess funds in Revolving Funds 1 and 2 may be 
invested in obligations issued or guaranteed by the United States. The corporation may 
invest excess funds in Revolving Fund 7 in such debt obligations as the corporation 
considers appropriate. 
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The assets from terminated pension plans and recoveries from the general 
assets of plan sponsors are accounted for in a trust fund that is not included in the 
federal budget. Trust fund assets were most recently valued at $48.1 billion. There 
are no statutory limitations on how the PBGC can invest the assets in its trust fund. 
Figure 2 diagrams the relationship between the PBGC’s financing and its 
payment of guaranteed benefits to plan participants. 
Figure 2. Financial Structure of the PBGC 
Source: Congressional Budget Office. 
As shown in Figure 3, PBGC’s trust fund has grown significantly since 2003, 
while the size of the revolving fund has remained relatively steady, despite recent 
increases in both the variable premium and flat-rate premium. 
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Figure 3. PBGC Assets Held in Trust Fund and Revolving Fund, 
1997-2007 
Source: Annual Reports of the PBGC, 1997-2007. 
Accounting in the Federal Budget 
The assets in PBGC’s investment portfolio are only partly accounted for in 
the federal budget. The revolving fund is a budgetary account, meaning that cash 
flows into and out of the account appear in the federal budget. In contrast, PBGC’s 
trust fund is nonbudgetary. When the PBGC assumes control of the assets of an 
underfunded pension plan that has been terminated, those assets do not appear on the 
federal balance sheet, and transfers of such assets to the PBGC are not treated as 
receipts to the government.14 While investment returns to the revolving fund appear 
as a receipt or outlay (in the case of negative returns) for the Federal government, 
investment returns to the trust fund do not. 
14
 For more information, see CRS Report RS22650, The PBGC and the Federal Budget, by 
William Klunk. 
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Oversight of PBGC Investments 
Under federal law, the PBGC’s investment policy statement must be approved 
by PBGC’s Board of Directors, which consists of the Secretary of Labor, the 
Secretary of the Treasury, and the Secretary of Commerce.15 According to PBGC’s 
by-laws, the Board reviews the investment policy statement at least every two years, 
and approves the investment policy statement at least every four years.16 The 
PBGC’s investment policy is implemented by PBGC’s staff, but PBGC does not 
actively manage its portfolio. Invested assets are managed by professional 
management firms or are invested in passive market index funds, subject to PBGC 
oversight. 
PBGC’s New Investment Policy. In February 2008, the PBGC 
announced that it had adopted a new investment policy aimed at generating higher 
investment returns while providing increased protection against the risk of increasing 
its deficit over time. As shown in Table 3, the new policy allocates 45% of the 
PBGC’s assets to fixed-income investments, 45% to equity investments, and 10% to 
alternative investment classes, including real estate and private equity. 
Table 3. Target Asset Allocation of PBGC Trust Fund, 2008 
Asset Class 
Core Equities 
US Equities 
Non-U.S. Equities 
Alternative Equities (emerging markets) 
Core Fixed Income 
Long-term Corporate Bonds 
Long-term Treasury Bonds 
Treasury Inflation Protected Securities 
Alternative Fixed Income 
High-yield Bonds 
Emerging-market Bonds 
Other Investments 
Real Estate 
Private Equity 
Total 
Allocation 
39% 
20% 
19% 
6% 
40% 
14% 
22% 
4% 
5% 
2% 
3% 
10% 
5% 
5% 
100% 
Source: Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation. 
15
 For a more detailed discussion of the Boards’ oversight responsibilities, see GAO report 
08-667, PBGC ASSETS: Implementation of New Investment Policy Will Need Stronger 
Board Oversight at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d08667.pdf. 
16
 See 73 Federal Register 29,985 (May 23, 2008). 
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The PBGC’s previous investment policy, adopted in 2004, set an equity 
investment target of 15% to 25%, with the remaining assets to be allocated primarily 
to fixed income investments. In practice, the PBGC’s actual asset allocation differed 
slightly from the target allocations. As shown in Table 4, the PBGC’s new policy 
significantly expands PBGC’s exposure to alternative asset classes and equity 
securities. 
Table 4. Previous PBGC Target Investment Allocation, Actual 
Investment Allocations, and New Target Allocation 
Previous FY 2004 FY 2005 FY 2006 FY 2007 
Asset Class Target Actual Actual Actual Actual New 
Target 
Equity Securities 15-25% 37.55% 26.34% 27.24% 31.57% 45% 
Fixed Maturity 75-85% 62.07% 73.54% 72.75% 68.35% 45% 
Other Alternatives - 0.39% 0.12% 0.01% 0.07% 10% 
Note: Numbers may not add up to 100% due to rounding. 
Source: CRS analysis of data from the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation. 
Throughout its history, the PBGC has shifted the investment of trust fund 
assets between bonds and stocks with changes in its leadership and in financial 
analysts’ theories of risk management. From the agency’s inception in 1974 until 
1990, the PBGC Board approved a policy of investing primarily in equity securities, 
aiming to maximize investment returns. In 1990, the PBGC reduced its equity 
exposure and increased its investment in long-term bonds with maturities matched 
to the agency’s liabilities. Beginning in 1994, it switched back to a policy of greater 
investment in equities. 
As shown in Figure 4, the PBGC’s investments in equities have ranged 
between 18% and 40% of assets since 1990. The investment policy announced in 
February 2008 – with a target of investing 45% of assets in equities – would result 
in the PBGC’s highest percentage investment in equities at any time since 1990. 
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Figure 4. Percentage of PBGC Assets Invested in Equities, 
1990-2007 
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The PBGC has stated that the objective of the new investment policy is to 
“prudently maximize investment returns in order to meet the Corporation’s current 
and future obligations.”17 The PBGC has stated that it expects the policy to generate 
higher returns and to reduce risk by diversifying its asset allocation, including 
investment in alternative assets such as private equity.18 A forecasting model 
developed by PBGC’s investment consultant, Rocaton Investment Advisors, LLC, 
suggested that shifting the PBGC’s allocation from fixed income to equities and/or 
alternative asset classes would improve the PBGC’s financial condition in the 
17
 Millard, Charles. “PBGC's New Diversified Investment Policy,” Pension & Benefits 
Daily. Vol. 8, No. 42 (March 4, 2008). 
18
 PBGC press release, “PBGC Announces New Investment Policy,” February 18, 2008, at 
[http://www.pbgc.gov/media/news-archive/news-releases/2008/pr08-19.html]. Hereafter 
cited as “PBGC press release, February 18, 2008.” 
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long-run. According to the Rocaton analysis, the new asset mix chosen by PBGC 
gives the agency a 57% likelihood of full funding within ten years, compared to 19% 
under the previous policy.19 The study by Rocaton estimated that, compared to the 
previous policy, the PBGC’s expected funded ratio would be higher, and its worst-
case funded ratio would be lower, under the new investment policy compared to the 
previous policy. 
Investment Strategies 
Other things being equal, higher expected rates of return on investment are 
associated with higher levels of investment risk. However, the PBGC has asserted 
that even though its equity exposure is increasing, it expects its new investment 
policy to reduce its overall risk through asset diversification. Under the new policy, 
the PBGC would hold 45% of its assets in equities, 45% in bonds, and 10% in 
alternative investments. The PBGC’s previous investment portfolio was less 
diversified, consisting mainly of long-term, investment-grade bonds. 
The PBGC also has stated that its long-term investment horizon allows it to 
benefit from what is sometimes called “time diversification.” This is a theory of 
investment that asserts that the risk associated with investing in stocks decreases over 
time.20 In its analysis for the PBGC, Rocaton stated that, “investors with time 
horizons of 10-20 years and greater seem well-positioned to wait out market volatility 
and realize the significant long-term rewards of investing in riskier assets.”21 While 
there is general agreement among economists on the benefits of asset diversification 
with respect to portfolio risk, there is a divergence of opinion as to whether or not 
investment risk associated with a particular asset or class of assets declines as the 
period of time that the asset is held increases. 
The changes in the PBGC’s investment policy in 2004 and 2008 embody two 
very different approaches to investment risk that reflect this divergence of opinion. 
These approaches can be referred to as a “total return” strategy and an “asset-liability 
matching” strategy. 
The “total return” approach. The new PBGC investment strategy, with 
its emphasis on increasing the proportion of assets invested in equities, is based in 
part on the assumption that the higher expected rate of return on equities will result 
in the PBGC’s assets growing faster than its liabilities. This approach is used by a 
majority of the pension plans that the PBGC insures (see Figure 5). Asset allocation 
decisions are based upon what investors believe will deliver the highest possible 
return for a given level of risk, measured as the likely deviation of rates of return 
around the average. Common stocks – equities – have a higher expected rate of 
return than bonds, but they also are riskier in that the actual rates of return vary more 
around the average than the rates of return on bonds. Investors with long time 
horizons often invest a greater percentage of assets in equities than investors with 
19
 PBGC press release, February 18, 2008. 
20
 PBGC press release, February 18, 2008. 
21
 R ocaton Investment Advisors, LLC., Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation Investment Policy and 
Strategy Discussion, December 4, 2007, p. 67. 
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shorter-term time horizons. They expect that the higher long-run expected rate of 
return on equities will offset the risk associated with the greater volatility of the rate 
of return on equities.22 
Figure 5. Average Percentage Allocation of Assets Among the 
200 Largest Defined Benefit Pension Plans, 2007 
Note: The “Other” category includes investments in cash (1.2%), real estate equity (3.6%), and other 
unspecified investments. 
Source: Pensions and Investments, 2007 year-end survey of defined benefit plans. 
22
 This investment strategy is the basis for the allocation of assets in the “life-cycle” funds 
offered by many 401(k) plans. The assets of younger plan participants, who will not need 
access to their retirement funds for many years, are invested primarily in equities under the 
assumption that their long time horizon will give their investment portfolios time to recover 
from short-term declines in the stock market. As participants grow older, and are nearer to 
retirement, their assets are slowly re-allocated to a heavier concentration in bonds, which 
have a lower expected rate of return than stocks, but also are less subject to large capital 
losses than stocks. 
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The PBGC would now have a significantly higher funded status had the 
agency recently been more heavily invested in equities than its previous policy 
allowed. The PBGC is required by the Pension Protection Act of 2006 to estimate 
the effects of an asset allocation of 60% to the Standard & Poor’s 500 equity index 
and 40% to the Shearson-Lehman Aggregate Bond Index. For the fiscal year ending 
September 30, 2007, this allocation would have increased the assets of the PBGC by 
an estimated $2.3 billion. Over the five-year period ending September 30, 2007, the 
PBGC’s assets would have been an estimated $7.3 billion higher with a portfolio 
invested 60% in stocks and 40% in bonds.23 
Unlike a corporate pension plan, however, the PBGC is fully exposed to the 
risk of investment losses. Corporate pension plans may be encouraged to invest in 
equities by the presence of PBGC insurance. A company sponsoring an insured 
pension has a sort of “heads we win, tails you lose” relationship with the PBGC. In 
contrast, the PBGC has no other party onto which it can offload its unfunded 
liabilities except, ultimately, the taxpayers. The GAO has noted that: 
Investments in riskier assets with higher expected rates of return may allow 
financially weak plan sponsors and their plan participants to benefit from 
the upside of large positive returns on pension plan assets without being 
truly exposed to the risk of losses. The benefits of plan participants are 
guaranteed by PBGC, and weak plan sponsors that enter bankruptcy can 
often have their plans taken over by PBGC.24 
The “asset-liability matching” approach. The assumption that the risk 
of holding stocks decreases as the period of time that they are held increases is 
disputed by some economists. These economists assert that the risk associated with 
stocks actually rises with the length of time that they are held. They note that: 
If stocks were not risky in the long run, then the financial services industry 
would be quite willing to provide — maybe even for free — long-term 
financial contracts that provide a rock solid guarantee that investors would 
not lose money if they held on to a broadly diversified stock portfolio for, 
say, 30 years. Yet such long-term put option contracts do not even exist, 
because financial market participants believe that the risk of such a contract 
is increasing with the time horizon, not decreasing.25 
Modern portfolio theory holds that the higher expected return on stocks is 
exactly the price of the risk associated with the investment and that the risk-adjusted 
rates of return on stocks and bonds are equal. Despite the higher expected nominal 
rate of returns on stocks, the present value of $1 invested in bonds at any given time 
is equal to the present value of $1 invested in stocks. The higher rate of return on 
23
 PBGC, Annual Management Report 2007. 
24
 David Walker, Comptroller General of the United States, “The Pension Benefit Guaranty 
Corporation and Long-Term Budgetary Challenges.” June 9, 2005. Testimony before the 
Committee on the Budget, House of Representatives, at [http://www.gao.gov/new.items/ 
d05772t.pdf]. 
25
 Brown, Jeffrey R., Hassett, Kevin A. and Smetters, Kent A., “Top Ten Myths of Social 
Security Reform,” October 2005, at [http://ssrn.com/abstract=1150180] 
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stocks – the so-called “equity premium” – represents compensation to an investor for 
taking on the additional risk, measured as the standard deviation on the expected rate 
of return, of holding stocks rather than bonds.26 Given this risk, a pension fund, for 
example, should choose an asset allocation that minimizes the risk that the fund will 
be unable to pay its liabilities when they come due as a result of an untimely decline 
in the value of equities. This approach – often called asset-liability matching – favors 
investment in fixed-income instruments, such as bonds, with maturities that are 
matched to the times at which the pension plan’s liabilities will come due for 
payment.27 
The value of a pension plan’s liabilities is greatly influenced by changes in 
interest rates. Like bonds, changes in pension plan liabilities are inversely related to 
changes in interest rates. Liabilities increase when interest rates fall and decrease 
when interest rates rise.28 Some economists have argued that pension plans should 
invest all of their assets in bonds that are matched to the plan’s expected cash flows 
in order to avoid the possibility that the pension plan will be forced to sell bonds that 
have not yet reached maturity at a time of rising interest rates.29 
In contrast, investing assets in equities can be a poor hedge against interest 
rate swings. Stock prices often rise when interest rates fall, providing protection from 
interest rate risk, but there have been periods when this was not true, including the 
period from 2000 to 2002, when a bear market in stocks coincided with falling 
interest rates. In 2004, soon after experiencing capital losses in equity investment, 
the PBGC announced that it would adopt an asset-liability matching approach to 
investing its assets, thus reducing its equity exposure in favor of fixed-income 
securities matched to its liabilities. At that time, the PBGC noted that adopting a 
portfolio concentrated in high-quality, long-term bonds would bring it closer to the 
portfolios held by insurance companies, which have historically limited their equity 
exposure. According to the American Council of Life Insurers (ACLI), bonds 
represent the majority of assets held by private life insurance providers. While equity 
represents about 5% of total insurance company assets, 72% of insurance company 
assets are in bonds.30 
There is some evidence that corporate pension plans also are exploring 
asset-liability matching as an investment strategy. Provisions in the PPA and the 
26
 The standard deviation of the rate of return is a measure of the likely variation of annual 
rates of return around the average – or expected – rate of return. 
27
 Jeremy Gold and Nick Hudson, “Creating Value in Pension Plans – Gentlemen Prefer 
Bonds,” Journal of Applied Corporate Finance, 2003. 
28
 A bond with a face value of $1,000 that pays annual interest of $50 (or 5%) could be sold 
for $1,250 if interest rates were to fall to 4% because $50 is 4% of 1,250. However, the 
bond could be sold for only $833 if interest rates were to rise to 6% because $50 is 6% of 
$833. When the bond matures, the original issuer will pay the holder the face value of 
$1,000, regardless of the prevailing rate of interest. Maturity-matched pension plan 
portfolios are thus “immunized” against the risk of unfavorable changes in interest rates. 
29
 Bodie, Zvi. “On Asset-Liability Matching and Federal Deposit and Pension Insurance.” 
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis Review, July/August 2006, 88(4), pp. 323-29, at 
[http://research.stlouisfed.org/publications/review/06/07/Bodie.pdf]. 
30
 ACLI, Fact Book 2007. 
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enactment of Financial Accounting Standard No. 158 provide incentives for pension 
fund managers to move away from more volatile pension investments such as stocks. 
The PPA reduced the number of years over which plans can “smooth” (average) their 
investment gains and loses, and FAS 158 requires corporations that sponsor defined 
benefit pensions to put the funded status of the plan on their balance sheets, rather 
than in a footnote as was required before.31 
The pension actuarial firm, Milliman, Inc., reported in a recent study that the 
percentage of pension plan assets invested in equities declined from 60% in 2006 to 
55% in 2007.32 A recent examination of investment allocations made in 2007 by the 
defined benefit pension plans of firms in the Standard & Poor’s 500 index noted that 
firms were reducing their pension plans’ investment in equities in favor of increased 
investment in bonds and other assets, including hedge funds and private equity. 
However, in this survey the median equity allocation in 2007 was still 63%, down 
only slightly from the 65% median allocation in 2006.33 
Because the pension plans that the PBGC insures are heavily invested in 
equities, an asset-liability matching approach would help to ensure that the PBGC’s 
own financial condition would not deteriorate at the same time that the assets held 
by the pension plans it insures are declining in value. If the PBGC invests 
substantially in equities, it risks having to take over underfunded plans at the same 
time that its own assets are declining in value because pension plan underfunding 
often increases during periods of falling stock prices. 
Implications of the New Policy 
PBGC’s Future Financial Condition 
The PBGC’s decision in 2008 to reduce asset-liability matching in favor of 
a strategy aimed at generating higher expected returns was driven in part by the 
agency’s concerns about its deficit. The PBGC’s previous investment policy was not 
designed to maximize investment income, but to keep the agency’s deficit from 
deteriorating further while policymakers pursued reforms to address PBGC’s funding 
deficit. However, even after the PPA was enacted, the President’s Budget for 
FY2009 noted that “neither the single-employer nor multiemployer program has the 
resources to satisfy fully the agency’s long-term obligations to plan participants.”34 
31
 For an explanation of the smoothing provisions of the PPA, see CRS Report RL33703, 
Summary of the Pension Protection Act, by Patrick Purcell. 
32
 Milliman, 2008 Pension Funding Study. The study includes the 100 U.S. public 
companies with the largest defined benefit pension assets whose 2007 annual reports were 
released by March 15, 2008. 
33
 Credit Suisse, Pension Plans Losing Ground. July 18, 2008. 
34
 Budget of the United States Government, Fiscal Year 2009 – Appendix, p. 747, at 
[http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/budget/fy2009/appendix.html]. 
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The PBGC has limited authority to adopt policies that could directly affect 
its financial condition. Unlike insurers in the private sector, it has no authority to set 
the premiums for the insurance it provides. It cannot strengthen the funding 
requirements for insured plans, reduce the amount of pension benefits that it insures, 
or reject companies that it deems excessively risky to insure. All of these authorities 
rest exclusively with the United States Congress. The companies that sponsor 
defined benefit pension plans have a financial interest in lobbying Congress to 
persuade it not to make PBGC premiums too high or plan funding requirements too 
onerous, because increases in premiums and stricter funding standards directly affect 
these firms’ annual profit-and-loss statements. 
The PBGC is required by law to invest its income from premiums in 
securities backed by the full faith and credit of the U.S. government. It has the legal 
authority, however, to invest its trust fund, consisting mainly of the assets of 
underfunded plans for which the PBGC has become the trustee, in assets of its 
choice. In announcing the new investment policy adopted in 2008, the PBGC stated 
its desire to maximize its investment income, and thus reduce its deficit. However, 
while the PBGC has asserted that its new policy will be less risky in the long-term 
than its previous policy, some of the assumptions underlying that assertion are open 
to question. 
The PBGC adopted its new investment policy in part in response to an 
analysis of investment options conducted for the agency by Rocaton Investment 
Advisors, LLC. The conclusions reached in that analysis are sensitive to the methods 
and assumptions on which they were based. An assessment of the relative risks of 
the PBGC’s previous investment policy and its new policy, for example, depends 
largely on how the risk associated with each class of assets in the portfolio is 
measured, and on the relative weights of each class of asset in the old and new 
portfolios. 
The risk associated with holding a given financial asset is that the actual rate 
of return will deviate from the expected rate of return. This risk is measured as the 
standard deviation of the rate of return. The more volatile the asset – i.e., the more 
widely actual annual rates of return are dispersed around the average – the greater the 
standard deviation. In its study for the PBGC, Rocaton assumed that the rate of 
return on long-term Treasury bonds (with a 15-year average duration35) will have a 
standard deviation of 11.2%. CRS examined rates of return on long-term Treasury 
bonds over the period from 1926 through 2007 and found the standard deviation 
around the mean real rate of return to be 8.4% for 10-year Treasury bonds and 11.2% 
for 30-year Treasury bonds.36 The Rocaton study assumed that the rate of return on 
U.S. equities would have a standard deviation of 15%. CRS examined rates of return 
on U.S. equities as measured by the Standard & Poor’s 500 index over the period 
from 1926 through 2007 and found the standard deviation around the mean annual 
35
 Duration is a measurement of a bond’s price sensitivity to changes in market interest rates. 
For a typical bond, duration is less than the bond’s time to maturity. Price volatility is 
greater for a bond with longer duration compared to a similar bond with a lower duration. 
36
 From 1926 through 2007, both 10-year and 30-year Treasury bonds had a mean real rate 
of return of 5.3%. Rates of return were obtained from http://www.globalfinancialdata.com. 
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real rate of return to be 20%. Rocaton’s lower estimate of the volatility of returns on 
stocks could be significant to the extent that it could appear to make investments in 
stocks less risky than the historical data indicate. 
A determination as to whether the PBGC’s new, more equity-heavy 
investment policy will be less risky than the previous, more bond-heavy investment 
policy depends in part on the estimated volatility of the rates of return on stocks and 
bonds. It is not clear from the report prepared by Rocaton whether the analysts 
conducted a sensitivity analysis in which the key assumptions – such as the standard 
deviations of the rates of return on stocks and bonds – were changed to evaluate the 
effect on the results of the analysis. To the extent that the relative riskiness of the 
PBGC’s new investment policy compared to its previous policy is directly influenced 
by these and other key assumptions, it would be prudent for the model used by 
Rocaton to be subjected to a sensitivity analysis. 
It is possible that the shift away from asset-liability matching to an investment 
policy focused on earning higher rates of return on investment could increase the risk 
that the PBGC will experience a decline in the value of its investments at the same 
time that the plans it insures are becoming increasingly underfunded. In a stock 
market downturn, the plans that PBGC stands to inherit are likely to have 
experienced a drop in the value of their assets. If it were more heavily invested in 
equities, the PBGC would be exposed to the same investment losses as the plans that 
it insures, effectively giving the PBGC “double-exposure” to the effect of a stock 
market decline as the agency’s liabilities were increasing. 
Although the PBGC’s statements about the new investment policy have 
emphasized the Corporation’s long-term investment horizon, the PBGC still needs 
access to cash in the short-run to pay the benefits of beneficiaries in the plans it has 
trusteed. When looking at the PBGC’s current and potential future cash needs, 
Rocaton noted that the duration of the PBGC’s current liabilities allows the 
Corporation to weather short-term volatility in its investment portfolio. However, 
Rocaton did not examine PBGC’s contingent liabilities – the liabilities that the 
PBGC has not yet assumed from underfunded plans that have yet to terminate – 
noting only that these liabilities are uncertain in both timing and magnitude. 
In contrast to the PBGC’s new investment policy, the asset allocation strategy 
of the Pension Protection Fund (PPF), the government-sponsored guarantor of 
defined benefit pensions in the United Kingdom, attempts to mitigate the risk of the 
Fund’s assets declining concurrently with an increase in the under-funding of the 
pension plans it insures.37 As Table 5 shows, the PPF is invested predominantly in 
fixed income securities. 
37
 Pension Protection Fund, “Statement of Investment Principles,” July 2008, at 
[http://www.pensionprotectionfund.org.uk/sip_july_2008.pdf]. 
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Table 5. Asset Allocation of UK Pension Protection Fund, 2008 
Asset Allocation 
Cash 20.0% 
Global Bonds 50.0% 
UK Equities 12.5% 
Global Equities 7.5% 
Property 7.5% 
Currency Overlay 2.5% 
Total 100% 
Source: UK Pension Protection Fund. 
Risks for Taxpayers 
The PBGC’s previous asset-liability matching investment strategy had very 
little chance of eliminating the PBGC’s deficit. According to PBGC’s former 
Director, Steven Kandarian, the previous investment strategy was a tool to keep the 
program from falling further into deficit while policymakers pursued long-term 
solutions to the problem of pension underfunding.38 The new policy will likely 
generate higher average annual returns than the previous policy. However, it also 
increases the likelihood that the PBGC will suffer investment losses concurrently 
with an increase in the underfunding of the plans that it insures. 
If the PBGC’s new investment policy generates higher expected returns, 
accompanied by reduced risk – as the PBGC and Rocaton have asserted – then U.S. 
taxpayers, as the de facto guarantors of PBGC insurance, will be better off. If the 
higher returns are accompanied by commensurately higher risk, then taxpayers are 
neither better nor worse off, because the PBGC’s true financial condition will not 
have changed. However, if that higher risk results in investment losses that the 
agency would not have experienced under the previous policy, and the PBGC’s 
deficit grows, then taxpayers will be worse off. 
Taxpayers also could be worse off if higher investment returns forestall 
fundamental reforms in PBGC financing – such as adopting risk-based premiums – 
that could improve the long-term financial condition of the agency and reduce the 
risk that they will at some point in the future have to bail out an insolvent PBGC. 
PBGC press release, January 29, 2004. 
